13th A-PBA Biorisk Conference in Beijing, China. Strategizing Biosafety and Biosecurity in Today’s Advancing Technological Era and Changing Security Landscape.


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Conference Highlight



Strategizing Biosafety and Biosecurity in Today’s Advancing Technological Era and Changing Security Landscape

Co-organiser: Chinese Preventive Medicine Association (CPMA) 中华预防医学会, National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention 中国疾病预防控制中心, Ministry of Health, China


2 days Pre-Conference Workshops & 2 days Conference highlights:

  • Global partnership and strategy for health security, in response to changing safety and security landscape.
  • Collective roles in tackling regional biorisk issues from bio-preparedness, bio-resources to dilemma between Bioethics, Biosafety, Biosecurity, etc
  • Addressing impact of existing technological tools versus conventional solution for practical biosafety and biosecurity.
  • More thought provoking topics and experience sharing from global strategy, to legislation, leveraging of technology for operational issues such as people, management, etc
  • Pre-conference workshop of regional interest


Other conference activities:

  • IFBA Biosafety Professional Certification Course & Examination


Opportunity for networking:

Experience sharing and networking with international biosafety safety experts


Opportunity for exhibition & sponsorship:

Exhibits showcasing the latest in laboratory biosafety and biosecurity products and services


Biosafety Community Coming Together:

  • IFBA Certification Exam Session
  • National Biosafety Associations/Working Groups in the Asia-Pacific meeting


This regional conference aims at generating a forum exchange on the various current Biosafety and biosecurity issues of concern at the global, regional, national and technical level.


Topics of discussion range from biorisk, bio-preparedness to sharing of scientific knowledge and technical issues of concern in the region. Special features include current hottest debate on Harnessing Sciences VS Bio Threat of multidiscipline, updates on new innovative biotechnology, duel use etc.


International biosafety experts and professionals from around the world will be speaking and sharing their knowledge and experiences. This conference will be a valuable opportunity for networking and be updated with the current development on biosafety and biosecurity uniquely to the Asia-Pacific region.

Who Should Attend

  • Biosafety Professionals and practitioners
  • Researchers and laboratory workers
  • Biosafety Managers & Consultants
  • Engineers and Architects
  • Suppliers and Vendors
  • Professionals interested in updates of biosafety and biosecurity
  • Senior Administrations, Directors and Managers from healthcare industry, educational institutes, veterinary and other industry cluster


Call for Poster Presentation 


We are inviting biosafety practitioners and professionals who wish to share their experiences and expertise to submit the abstract for poster presentation at the conference.


The A-PBA Organizing Committee invites submission for poster presentation at the 13th A-PBA Annual Conference that will be held from 28th Aug to 31st Aug 2018 in Beijing, China. The theme of the conference is: "Strategizing Biosafety and Biosecurity in Today’s Advancing Technological Era and Changing Security Landscape"


The following broad topics are the focus for the A-PBA Conference however, papers on other appropriate topics that relate to the goals of the conference will be considered

  • Biosafety / Laboratory Biosafety /Biosecurity / Laboratory Biosecurity
  • Regulatory initiatives impacting biosafety and biosecurity
  • Containment facility design, commissioning, maintenance and operation
  • Biorisk applications related to Infectious diseases affecting humans or animals
  • Containment/laboratory equipment
  • Biological risk assessment / mitigations and communication
  • Applied research and innovations impacting biosafety and biosecurity


The abstract submission deadline is 14th July 2018.   Selected abstracts will be printed in the conference program booklet.

For more information on poster presentation, please contact our A-PBA secretariat at secretariat@a-pba.org or Dr. Diah Iskandriati atie@indo.net.id

Guidelines for Submission of Abstract for Poster Presentation


Each registrant may submit one abstract of his or her presentation during the conference.


Please take note that all abstracts will be reviewed by the scientific committee. All registrants will be advised accordingly by 28th July 2018.


Selected abstracts will ONLY be accepted upon receipt of registration and payment for the conference fee.



  1. All abstracts must be in ENGLISH, the combined length of the abstract title, list of authors, and body should not exceed 300 words. Please be sure to carefully check your abstract for content errors, spelling, names, etc. before submitting. A-PBA does not proofread for correct spelling, typographical, grammatical, or scientific errors, nor can changes be made once the abstract is submitted.
  2. Title should be brief, in bold capital letters at the top of the abstract.
  3. Author(s) should be listed by surname (underline) and initials, with the presenting author’s name underlined. The designation and organization should immediately follow the authors’ names. (Organization/Institute, department, city, state, country of author).
  4. Text must be typed single-spaced, font 12 Arial with only the left margin justified.
  5. Leave one line between the title/author/institution and the body  of the abstract.
  6. Each abstract should contain: (a) an introductory sentence indicating the objective of the abstract (b) main content, including methods and results if relevant and (c) conclusions. It is expected that the abstract will include the summary of the original presentation.
  7. Graphs, tables and illustration cannot be included in the abstract.
  8. The abstract document MUST BE in WORD.doc format. Any other file type WILL NOT be accepted.
  9. Abstracts must be submitted by email to secretariat@a-pba.org as Microsoft Word attachment.


*Note to All Presenters

**The Organizing Committee reserves the right to amend or change any part of the submission guidelines without prior notice.


Pre-Conference Program


Day 1: Tuesday, 28 August 2018

Time / Workshop



9.00 - 5.00pm

WS 1

Room 1

Practical, Certifiable and Sustainable BSL3/Animal BSL3 Facility Design Principles

  • The rule of thumb to reduce unnecessary costs without compromising Biosafety
  • Fit for Purpose design - Every Bio-containment facility should be designed differently
  • Meeting certification requirements from the very beginning...And every year after
  • Energy savings options
  • Biosafety Cabinets facts that may surprise you
  • Create a maintenance plan that everyone can use
  • Bonus: Get to design a BSL3 facility during the course! 

Mr Theodore Traumm

(World BioHazTec Inc., USA)

Mr Dan Yoong

(World BioHaztec Pte Ltd, Singapore)


9.00 - 5.00pm

WS 2

Room 2

Effective Risk Assessment, Management and Communication

  • Introduction to Risk Assessment & management –Activity base hazard identification, evaluation and mitigation
  • Balancing risk perception & acceptability – business opportunity, safety and security
  • Effective assessment  & evaluation – optimism resources (GMO Risk assessment)
  • Table top exercise

Ms Chook Mee Lan

(Temasek Life Sciences Laboratory, Singapore)

Dr Se Thoe Su Yun

(Ministry of Health, Singapore)

9.00 - 12.00 noon

WS 3

Room 3

Developing a Biorisk Management Program. A bilingual training in English and Mandarin

  • Fundamental principle and essential elements of a biosafety and biosecurity program
  • Institute Biosafety Program – case study in the regional context etc.
  • Introduction to IFBA Biorisk Managnment Certification Exam
  • CWA15793, PDCA cycle etc

Mrs T.S. Saraswathy

(Institute for Medical Research, Malaysia)

Prof Dr Lim Yang Mooi

(Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia)

2.00 - 5.00pm

WS 4

Room 3

Dual-Use Bioethics Education for Effective Biosecurity

  • Develop an understanding of the concept of professional responsibility as regards dual-use life science research and biosecurity;
  • Raising awareness of existing bioethics education tools for undergraduate and graduate programs; adult learning;
  • Enhance participants' understanding of the role of active learning methods and approaches for teaching ethics;
  • Provide guidelines and practical tips for introducing dual-use bioethics concepts in life science teaching and training.

Dr Tatyana Novossiolova

(Law Program Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria;

Scientific expert, Landau Network Italy)

9.00 - 12.00 noon

WS 10

Room 4

Outlook of Working in the Box: How to Work Safely and Efficiently in BSL-4 

  • Overview of the design principles behind the BSL-4 laboratory
  • Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) requirements
  • Working safely in the BSL-4
  • Things to consider while working in the BSL-4

Prof Xiangguo Qiu

Mr. Anders Leung

(Special Pathogens Program

National Microbiology Laboratory

Public Health Agency of Canada)

2.00 - 5.00pm

WS 11

Room 4

Laboratory Biorisk Assessment In Response to Emerging Infectious Disease

  • Background introduction of emerging infectious diseases;
  • What are biorisk factors of biosafety laboratory facing during emerging responses;
  • What we should prepare for avoiding or reducing biorisk?

Dr Mifang Liang

Dr Jun Liu

(National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention,

China CDC)



Day 2: Wednesday, 29 August 2018


Time / Workshop



9.00 - 5.00pm

WS 5

Room 1

Applied Biosafety & Biosecurity in Animal Research

  • Animal biosafety -  Safety for human health and environment
  • Dealing with known and unknown emerging & remerging zoonotic agent
  • Animal Bio-containment Facilities
  • Decontamination of animal waste

Dr Stuart Blacksell

(Mahidol-Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit (MORU), Thailand)

9.00 - 12.00noon

WS 6

Room 2

Biosafety Cabinet (BSC) - Principles Performance, Certification & Validations

  • Effective use of BSC,
  • Improve performance, optimize  operating
  • Validation, certification and maintenance
  • The NSF certification test standard
  • Introduction to NSF certification course

Mr Kenny Chee

(NSF Accredited Biosafety Cabinet Field Certifier
ESCO International, Singapore)

2.00 - 5.00pm

WS 7

Room 2

Biological Waste Management

  • Biological waste in different facilities
  • Autoclaving, Incineration, Chemical disinfection and decontamination
  • Validation, and limitations

Dr Philippe Stroot,

(XIBIOS Biosafety Consulting, Belgium)

9.00 - 12.00noon

WS 8

Room 3

Biosafety Officers: Roles, Responsibilities and Skills Development 

  • What does it take to be a Biosafety Officer?
  • What does a Biosafety Officer do?
  • Engaging training techniques for laboratories personnel
  • Leadership Tools for Today's Biosafety Professional

Mrs T.S.Saraswathy

(Institute for Medical Research, Malaysia)

2.00 - 5.00pm

WS 9

Room 3

Biosafety & Biosecurity Emergency Responses (ER)

  • Developing an organization ER plan
  • Incident response procedure - from manageable level to crisis level
  • Incident reporting – reportable & non-reportable incident
  • Emergency scenario in laboratory – Table top exercise (spill management, injury, natural disasters, theft and loss of biosecurity agent)

Prof Dr Lim Yang Mooi

(Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia)

Dr Diah Iskandriati

(Primate Research Center, Bogor Agricultural University, Indonesia)

9.00 - 12.00 noon

WS 12

Room 4

Enhancing Ethical Competence to Cope with Emerging Infectious Disease: Lessons Learned from Ebola Outbreak

  • Ethical concerns and dilemmas during infectious disease outbreaks
  • Guidelines and frameworks for managing ethical issues in responses to emerging pathogen
  • Case studies and small group discussion
  • Ethical competencies and preparedness for public health decision making

Dr Bin Chen

(Deputy Associate Director for Science

Division of Laboratory Systems

US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)

2.00 - 5.00pm

WS 13

Room 4

Scientific Research and Biosafety Considerations

  • Microbes and recombination DNA technology
  • Researches with select agents (higher pathogenic microbes)
  • Risk assessment for a research project - A risk assessment is crucial for the success of a project
  • Biosafety training for researchers
  • Management of laboratory biosafety with research projects

Biosafety Management for infectious Control Research

  • Biosafety training for reasearchers
  • Management of laboratory biosafety with research projects

Dr Di Qu

(Basic Medical College of Fudan University)

Dr Zhiming Yuan

(Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS)

Dr Yong Zhang

National Insititute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention,

China CDC)



Conference Program


Strategizing Biosafety and Biosecurity in Today’s Advancing Technological Era and Changing Security Landscape


Conference Session Topic


Global partnerships for Biosafety and Biosecurity in Global Health Security

Keynote 1: Working Safely and Securely: A Scientists’ Obligation to Society

Mr Jim Welch

(Executive Director, Elizabeth R Griffin Research Foundation)

Keynote 2: Emerging Disease Threats in China: Public Health Security Preparedness and Control  

Dr Fu Gao

(Academician of China Academy of Sciences

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention)

From SARS to MERS: The Laboratory Biosafety in China

Prof Guizhen Wu

(National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC)

Implementing International Health Regulations and Ensuring Port Biosafety

Dr Hui Guo

(Dept of Health & Quarantine Supervision, Gen Admin of Customs, P.R. China)

A-PBA  Partnership with China: Visions and Milestones 

Dr Chua Teck Mean

(Temasek Life Sciences Laboratory, Singapore)

Strategizing Global Biosafety and Biosecurity in Todays' Changing Safety and Security Landscape

New Era of China’s Biotechnology Innovation

Dr Yanrong Sun

(Science and Technology Development Center

The People’s Republic of China Ministry of Science and Technology)

Health Security Partner (HSP) Biosecurity Programs and Regional Activities

Dr Prasad Kuduvalli

(Director, Scientific Programs & Engagement, Health Security Partner (HSP), USA)

Synthetic biology – New Challenges for Biosafety?


Dr Jianwei Wang

(Institute for Pathogen Biology

Chinese Academy of Medical Science)

Preventing Agroterrorism Through Biosecurity Safeguards

Prof Dr Irma Makalinao

(Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology, University of Philippines)

Connecting Biosafety Communities: IFBA Mission and Vision 

Ms Maureen Ellis

(Executive Director, International Federation of Biosafety Association (IFBA))

International Federation of Biosafety Association: Biosafety Heroes 2017 Awards

Ms Maureen Ellis

(Executive Director, International Federation of Biosafety Association (IFBA))

Biorisk Education Programs and Bioethics for Life Sciences

Not by Good Intertions Alone: Educating Scientists about Dual-Use Bioethics and Changing Mindsets on Biosecurity

Dr Tatyana Novossiolova

(Law Program Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria;

Scientific expert, Landau Network Italy)

Addressing Gaps in Biorisk Capability Building in the Region - Is it Still a Challenge

Dr Philippe Stroot

(Project Leader, EU CBRN Centers of Excellence, Xibios Biosafety Consulting, Belgium)

Moving from Conventional to Learner Based Biorisk Training Programs   

Dr Viji Vijyayan

(Assistant Dean, Duke-NUS Medical School, Singapore)

Implementation of a Ladderized Biosafety Training Program in the RITM, Philippines 

Dr Plebian B Medina

(Research Institute for Topical Medicine (RITM), Philippines)


Meeting of A-PBA, IFBA and all National Biosafety Associations/Working Groups in the Asia-Pacific

Regional Networks and Biosafety Communities: Collective Role in Safety and Security

Capacity Building of Biosafety Guarantee on Animal Disease Prevention and Control in China

Dr Zhigao Bu

(Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences)

Methodology of Select Agent Management Investigation in Institute with Gap Analysis

Dr Hsing-Ming Chen

(President, Taiwan Biological Safety Association, Taiwan, China)
Capacity Building in Pakistan Through Global Networking Programs by Pakistan Biosafety Association

Prof Dr Shamsul Arfin Qasmi

(Karachi Institute of Medical Sciences (KIMS) / National University of Medical Sciences. Islamabad, Pakistan)

Bangladesh Biosafety Association - Contribution to Government and Society

Dr Asadulghani

(Head of Biosafety & BSL3 Laboratory, International Center for Diarrhoeal Disease Research (ICDDR), Bangladesh)

Biosafety and Biosecurity Initiatives by Thailand Biosafety Association: Strategic Framework and Challenges

Prof Dr Srisisn Khusmith

(Faculty of Tropical Medicine, Mahidol University, Thailand)

Governance of Biosafety and Biosecurity: Countries Experiences

The Network of National Pathgenic Microorganism Collection in China

Dr Qiang Wei

(Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention)

The Long Road toward a National Biosafety. A Sri Lankan Prospective 

Dr R Jayasuriya

(National Institute of Health Science, Kalutara, Sri Lanka)

Singapore Biological and Toxin Act: 12 Years of Enactment and Experiences

Dr Se Thoe Su Yun

(Biosafety Branch, Public Health Group, Ministry of Health, Singapore)

Biocontainment Inspections and Certifications in South Korea


Prof Dr Lee Hei Chan

(Department of Pharmaceutical Engineering, Sun Moon University, Korea)

Laboratory Acquired Infections 1979 -Present 

Dr Karen Byers

(Biosafety Manager, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute

Harvard University Medical College)

Challenges in Implementing Biorisk Management Program in Academic Institution in Indonesia

Dr Anis Karuniawati

(One Health Laboratory Network, Indonesia One Health University Network (INDOHUN)) 

 Biological Risk Management and Containment - Solutions for High Risk Environments and New Technologies 

Operation and Management of BSL-4 in Canada

Dr Xiangguo Qiu

(Special Pathogens Program

National Microbiology Laboratory

Public Health Agency of Canada)

U.S. CDC Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Risk Assessment Efforts

Dr John M. Saindon

(US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)

TB Laboratory Management and Containment 

Dr Nguyen Van Hung

(Dept of Microbiology & National TB Lab, National Lung Hosital, Vietnam)

Laboratory Quality and Biosafety Management in Brunei

Ms Sia Fwu Shii

(Ministry of Health, Brunei)

Biodecontamination: Challenging the Status Quo


Mr Damien Chew

(Application Specialist

World BioHazTec Pte Ltd)

 Technology Innovations for Simple and Practical Biosafety and biosecurity Solutions

The Unnoticed Common Problems and Risks Existed in the Bio-Safety Containments Today and Counter-Measures and Technical Solutions

Mr Mark Huza

(Director, R&D – Containment System, AAF Flanders, USA)

Occupational Health and Safety in Animal Facility of Pharmaceutical Industry

Dr Imelda L Winoto

(Dexa Laboratories of Biomolecular Sciences (DLBS), Indonesia)

Development and Application of Laboratory Biosafety Equipment in China

Dr Jiancheng Qi

(National Bio-Protection Engineering Centre of China)

Systemic Animal Models Reservoir and  Bio-safety Strategy for Serious Infectious Diseases in China

Dr Chuan Qin

(Institute for Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Science)

Seven Ways to Proven Energy Savings for BSL-3 Laboratories

Mr Theodore Traum

(World BioHazTec Inc., USA)

Closing & Final



A-PBA AGM 30 Aug 2018


*Program and speakers is subjected to changes without notice.


Speaker Abstract



Practical, Certifiable and Sustainable BSL3/Animal BSL3 Facility 

Mr Theodore J. Traum

World BioHazTec Inc.

Mr Dan Yoong

World BioHazTec Pte Ltd


Designing a containment facility is complicated especially for to-be-BSL3 project owners. To some, it feels like entering into an unknown arena of Guidelines, Certifications, Requirements and Engineering. This workshop is designed to provide professionals with such knowledge.

In this highly interactive workshop, participants will discover with hands-on experiences & exercises the principles of BSL3 / ABSL3 design and engineering. Each topic is inter-related and participants will have the opportunity to put together a BSL3 facility design applying these principles. It will also bring participants through the process of certification planning and execution.

Participants will learn to plan the layout of a BSL3 according to their risk assessments, calculate airflow requirement, design a HVAC  (Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning) system, draft engineering testing scenarios during certification and last but not least ensuring maintenance can be achieved for years to come.


Seven Ways to Proven Energy Savings for BSL-3 Laboratories

Mr Theodore J. Traum

World BioHazTec Inc.


High containment laboratories require unique environmental conditions for research. Expensive, energy-intensive HVAC systems are needed for protection of the environment, personnel, laboratory animals and product protection from contamination. Personal protective equipment adds to the challenge of maintaining thermal comfort for the laboratorian. Laboratory equipment such as lab freezers, incubators, water baths, refrigerators and autoclave/sterilizers can contribute significantly to the laboratory’s energy consumption. The result is laboratory facilities that typically consume six to ten times the energy consumed in a typical office building.

High containment laboratories demand even more special need designs to address solar gain while providing a positive work environment. Laboratory siting, system pressure drops, demand-based ventilation, dynamic control, lighting, discharge velocity and terminal discharge optimization are energy topics with which you should be familiar when planning your new facility or retrofitting your existing facility.

Opportunities for energy consumption and operating cost reduction are possible in containment laboratories. Seven ways to proven energy savings will be presented as a guide to achieve energy efficiency and energy savings.

The presentation will conclude with a discourse on becoming familiar with barriers to energy-efficient laboratory design. 




Ms Chook Mee Lan

Assistant Director, Facilities Services & Safety

Temasek Life Sciences Laboratory, Singapore. 

Dr Se Thoe Su Yun

Deputy Director, Biosafety Branch, Singapore Ministry of Heath.


This workshop introduces the principles of performing risk assessment in a biological environment. The methodology used is Activity Base risk assessment which includes hazard identification, evaluation, risk control and performance assessment. There will be class exercise with practical examples. Participants would be able to perform risk assessment in a systematic manner from technical measure, action to documentation by end of the workshop. There will also be a lecture touching on extension of Biorisk assessment to CBRN Preparedness


12-Year Experience in Enacting the Biological Agents & Toxins Act

Dr Su Yun Se-Thoe

Deputy Director, Biosafety Branch,Singapore Ministry of Health


Singapore enacted and enforced the Biological Agents and Toxins Act (BATA) in October 2005 and January 2006, respectively.  The BATA aims to prohibit or otherwise, regulate the possession, use, import, transfer and transportation of biological agents and toxins that are known to be hazardous to human health.  The introduction of the legislations and the related regulatory framework has markedly improved the biosafety and biosecurity awareness, practices and culture in Singapore.  The presentation will discuss the implications and lessons learnt from implementing the legislations, and the challenges encountered in the process of enforcing the regulations. 


Biosafety Officers: Roles, Responsibilities and Skills development

Mrs T.S. Saraswathy Subramaniam

Biosafety Consultant, Malaysia; President, Asia Pacific Biosafety Association


In recent years the roles and responsibilities of a biosafety professional (BSP) has expanded to reflect the increasing spectrum of biological risks in laboratories handling biological agents and toxins. The BSP’s main role as a biorisk officer is to provide guidance and oversight in the laboratory biorisk management program that encompasses biosafety and biosecurity.

The position of a biorisk officer is usually a delegated appointment from senior management to ensure compliance of national regulations and organizational policies. This role requires knowledge of all laboratory activities undertaken, experience and a formal training in biorisk management (BRM).  Competency of the biorisk personnel is vital to ensure quality of the BRM in the institution.

The objective of this interactive workshop training is to provide guidance on leadership skills, knowledge and expectations on the roles and responsibilities that are required of a biosafety professional.


Developing a Biorisk Management Program

A bilingual training in English and Mandarin

Mrs T.S.Saraswathy Subramaniam

Biosafety consultant, Malaysia; President, Asia Pacific Biosafety Association

Prof Lim Yang Mooi

Department of Pre-Clinical Sciences, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Lot PT21144, Jalan Sungai Long, Bandar Sungai Long, 43000 Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia


The objective of this pre-conference workshop is to provide guidance to participants an developing a laboratory biorisk management program. A laboratory biorisk management system is based on identifying biological risks in the workplace and mitigating these risks as a continuous improvement process to improve the organization’s overall performance and effectiveness. Laboratory biorisk management encompasses both laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. Establishing  a biosafety and biosecurity management program in an organization, minimizes risk to employees, the community and the environment that may be exposed to biological materials as a consequence of its activities.


Biosafety and Biosecurity Emergency Responses

Prof Lim Yang Mooi

Head of Programme, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman

Department of Pre-Clinical Sciences, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Lot PT21144, Jalan Sungai Long, Bandar Sungai Long, 43000 Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia


Dr Diah Iskandriati

Primate Research Center, Bogor Agricultural University (PRC-IPB)

Jalan Lodaya II/5, Bogor 16151, Indonesia


The global efforts through various agencies have created awareness in implementing biorisk management system to strengthen safe conduct in research laboratories. This is critical to provide a safer working environment with maximum protection to human, plant, animal, community and environment. Through these efforts, many people are more aware of the matters pertaining to laboratory bisosafety and biosecurity, and also concern about public health emergency, such as a natural disaster, act of terrorism or disease outbreak. Nevertheless, many are still not aware of the importance of emergency preparedness and response. Emergency preparedness and response is another area that should receive the same level of attention, as well as the resources and plans in anticipating such emergency should be in place for any possible emergencies. This course introduces the concept of emergency and incident response, as well as to provide a framework on how to respond to any emergencies and incidents. In addition, interactive session on responding to emergency and incident will be focused on first aid, chemical and biological spillage, as well as transportation.  At the end of the course, participants would gain the ability to recognize and respond to the emergency and incident happen in their laboratory appropriately.


Laboratory Biorisk Assessment in Response to Emerging Infectious Disease

Mifang Liang, Professor and Dr Jun Liu

Department for Viral hemorrhagic fever

National Insititute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC


  • Backgound introduction of Emerging infectious diseases;
  • what are biorisk factors of biosafety laboratory facing during emerging responses;
  • what we should prepare for avoiding or reducing biorisk?



Animal Biosafety

Prof Stuart D. Blacksell



Biosafety with regard to the use of animals is very important component of laboratory activities. All considerations relating to biosafety during working with animals should take a risk-based approach to ensure that there is an adequate balance between control measures and the hazards involved in the procedures.

There are numerous issues to consider including Animal Biosafety biocontainment level ABSL1-4), the safe use of pathogens including inoculation procedures, disinfection and decontamination, and biosafe cages and isolators. Issues relating to the “end of experiment” must also be addressed such as necropsy safety and carcass disposal.  Consideration should also be the consequences of an incident or accident resulting in a laboratory acquired infections (LAIs).

Selection of appropriate personal protective equipment is important for the mitigation of pathogen spread to staff and handlers. Primary containment including biological safety cabinets and other local exhaust and ventilation systems need to be considered in the light of the specialist animal facility. Facility design for secondary containment should also be considered in the context of an animal facility. Issues to consider the species , intrinsic hazards and the workload.

Finally, staff training and awareness of staff to the hazards and the correct use of control measures ensures a safe working environment.


Biosafety Cabinet (BSC) - Principles Performance, Certification & Validations

Mr Kenny Chee

Esco Global Technical Support Manager and Esco Biosafety Trainer

Esco Micro Pte Ltd


This workshop provides participants an understanding of Biological Safety Cabinet Types, Classifications and its airflow patterns. Participants would also learn different international standards governing the Biological Safety Cabinet Design and Field testing/certification. An overview on the primary field test methods with reference to ANSI/NSF49 standards and test instrument used will also be discussed


Biological Waste Management – Establishing Affordable and Sustainable Strategies for On-Site and Off-Site Treatment at Institutional and National Levels

Dr Philippe Stroot

Xibios Biosafety Consulting


The management of biological (including hospital) waste is a major problem in many resource limited countries. Most of these are indeed confronted to a severe lack of capacity for on-site and off-site treatment, and a number of practices appear suboptimal, resulting in possible exposure of the waste handlers, the populations and the environment.

The purpose of the course is

  1. to provide a global overview of biological waste management and its main issues;
  2. to focus on some common bad practices and difficulties related to the treatment of biological waste, and propose solutions to correct them;
  3. to present and discuss some alternatives to current waste treatment approaches;
  4. to consider and discuss two possible, opposite strategies for biological waste management plans a national level.

The workshop will be interactive, based on examples and shall include a case study, as a basis for discussion.


Addressing Gaps in Biorisk Management Capacity in SEA

Based on the observations made during a three-year EU Centre of Excellence project (Project CoE 46) aiming at strengthening biorisk management capacity in SEA, this lecture identifies the main gaps identified during the visits and meetings with the stakeholders, as well as some of the conclusions made. The author also shares some thoughts on possible ways to address some of these major gaps, from both a technical and a management standpoint, in order to ensure sustainably safe and efficient laboratory operations in the future.


Enhancing Ethical Competence to Cope with Emerging Infectious Disease: Lessons Learned from Ebola Outbreak

Dr Bin Chen

Deputy Associate Director for Science

Division of Laboratory Systems

US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention


The Ebola outbreak in 2014–2016 highlighted many ethical concerns and dilemmas that healthcare workers, public health practitioners, researchers, first responders and policy makers face during infectious disease outbreaks. This training session will outline the principles of public health ethics, present guidelines and frameworks for managing ethical issues in responses to emerging pathogens, and discuss the role of biosafety and laboratory professionals in risk assessment and management during outbreak responses.  The training will also include group discussions of case studies to illustrate how to use ethics frameworks in the decision making and competency development processes.


Working Safely and Securely – A Scientist’s Obligation to Society

Mr James M Welch


Elizabeth R Griffin Program, Georgetown University Medical Center


While much attention is paid to the technical skills and engineering controls needed to achieve safe research environments, a far more important aspect is the recognition of the social value and obligation to mitigate the risks that laboratory environments can pose both within and beyond the walls of the laboratory. In this presentation, we will examine the value of public and animal health to local, national and regional health security, the important role of research and diagnostic response to both communicable and non-communicable diseases, and the important role of scientists at all levels to promote and maintain safe and secure working environments and that build sustainable public trust and support in their work.  

From SARS to MERS: The Laboratory Biosafety in China

Prof Guizhen Wu

National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC


Biosafety is one of the core contents of national security, and laboratory biosafety is an important component of biosafety. Biosafety concerns the safety of the society, the public and the environment, it is an important guarantee for national interests and an indispensable part of national biosecurity. Based on the potential adverse effects of biotechnology development, the concept of biosafety is proposed. And the so-called biosafety generally refers to the potential threats to the ecological environment and human health caused by the development and application of modern biotechnology, and a series of effective prevention and control measures taken.

The biosafety problem caused by the progress of science and technology is an inevitable reflection of history. Compared with the traditional biological hazards, the modern biological hazards have undergone significant changes in the formation structure, the mechanism of action, the form of expression, and so on. The complexity and the scope of its influence are far more than before.


Implementing International Health Regulations and Ensuring Port Biosafety

Dr Hui Guo

Department of Health and Quarantine Supervision, the General Administration of Customs


A system for public health management has been strengthened with construction of core capacity at points of entry (POE) under the International Health Regulations (2005). After implementing a dynamic management of core capacity and creating international sanitary ports energetically, we are building up health quarantine lines not only at POE in China but also abroad and on way of travel for protecting our boarder and our people against infectious diseases related to international travel. The strategic pass of health quarantine at POE has been expanded to fight against plague, yellow fever, cholera, zika virus disease and other outbreaks of infectious diseases effectively. Bio-safety of laboratory has been strengthened and promoted as well. Since some labs of bio-security level-2 and one lab of bio-security level-3 have been established, we have detected out cases of rift valley fever, zika and other pathogens among international travellers. Because monitoring and controlling for imported vectors effectively, we have found 8 kinds of vector related rats and mosquitoes within 4-year-cycle. Now more than 14 categories of imported vectors can be surveyed. It helps us to capture non-domestic species including Ravenous Dormouse and Anopheles Gambia 1st time in China. Furthermore, Plague, hanta virus and other pathogens have been detected among imported vectors for many times. As a result of regulation enhancement for surveillance related to imported and exported microbes and biologics, process for special items such as microorganism and biological products has been improved. A monitoring system for imported and exported special items has been established including risk assessment, classification management and follow-up supervision. With the help of it, we have stopped some biological products entering into our territory illegally many times including botulinum toxin and syphilis positive sera, etc.


A-PBA Partnership With China – Visions & Milestones

Dr Teck-Mean Chua

Member of the Board



The SARS outbreak is believed to have started in November 2002 in Guangdong province of China and in February 2003, it spread to Hong Kong and then to other parts of the world. At that time, the regional and global community were not quite prepared for an outbreak of this nature.

A-PBA was formed in February 2005 after the SARS experience with the objective of bringing awareness of biosafety to our region in our collective effort to mitigate future threat resulting from outbreaks of highly infectious diseases of which the Asia Pacific region is known to be a hotbed of many emerging and re-emerging diseases.

To be truly an organization for the Asia Pacific region, we cannot ignore the fact that China and India are the two most populated nations in the world and as such, it is important to engage them in this “ Collective Ownership & Collective Leadership”  philosophy of A-PBA to be effective in mitigating the challenges of biosafety and biosecurity in our region and around the world.

This presentation will outline the challenges and opportunities ahead in biosafety and biosecurity for our region and how China can contribute in a significant way to our regional effort to help keep our region and the rest of the world a better and safer place to live and work in.


A New Era of Biotechnology Innovation in China

Dr Yanrong Sun, Professor

China National Center for Biotechnology Development


Biotechnology is a technology means which is the most closely related with human beings. It is the new high-tech and revolutionary engine of the new round of scientific and technological revolution after information technology. Biotechnology can be applied to solve major problems such as life health, economic development, resources and environment in a revolutionary prospect. All major countries around the world places great emphasis in the development of biotechnology and bio-industry. In this global context, China has vigorously supported biotechnology research in recent years and promoted the development of biotechnology industry. We have made great progress in this area, but there are many aspects left to be improved. This report will briefly elaborate the strategic needs and global trend for biotechnology development, the present situation and future key tasks for biotechnology development in China.


Building Local Biosafety & Biosecurity Capacity In The Context Of Health Security In Asia

Dr Prasad Kuduvalli

Director of Scientific Programs

Health Security Partners (HSP)


Health Security Partners (HSP), a non-profit organization based in Washington DC, is strengthening local capacity for biosafety and biosecurity in the context of ensuring that health systems are resilient to outbreaks of high consequence infectious disease. Most Asian countries are members of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), having pledged to strengthen capacity through eleven action packages, including biosafety and biosecurity, towards full implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005). This presentation will use key HSP partnerships across Asia to demonstrate the importance of locally-led activities in sustainable capacity building for countries, institutions, and professionals. HSP activities highlighted will include: health security fellowship programs, One Health approach to disease-specific training and technical assistance, systemic and institution-level interventions to advance biosafety and biosecurity goals, and bolstering south-south cooperation across Asia.


Synthetic Biology: An Emerging Challenge to Biosafety

Dr Jianwei Wang

Institute of Pathogen Biology, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences


Synthetic biology has emerged as a disruptive technology with potentials to change the biological rule as human beings will be able to modify the phenotypes of lives and even to design and create species artificially. There is particular significance of developing such technologies in microbe studies. It is believed that synthetic biology technologies will provide new insights into the pathogenesis of various pathogens and benefit the design and development of novel vaccines, drugs against the infections. These potentials have been exemplified by the researches on several viruses with public health importance in recent years. However, concerns on the misuse or abuse of such technologies have been increasing in parallel since the report on the de novo synthesis of poliovirus at the beginning of this century. The manipulations may alter the antigenicity, transmission, virulence, and resistance of specific microbes, leading to the potential increasing of pathogenesis in human beings and the evasion of therapies and prophylaxis available. The potential threat of such activities to public health and environment should be seriously considered and controlled. Strategies on improving the bio-risk management of synthetic biology, particularly the manipulations on pathogens are intensively needed.


Bridging Agroterrorism Prevention and Biosecurity 

Prof Dr Irma R. Makalinao, MD, MA, FPPS, FPSCOT

Professor 12 and Special Assistant to the Dean

University of the Philippines Manila, College of Medicine


The threat posed by agroterrorism may pose a challenge to national security. Agroterrorism prevention requires that we take a comprehensive step towards biosecurity considering impacts to human, animal, plant and environmental health (one health) and the country’s economy.  In areas where agriculture remains to be a major contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP), deliberate misuse of pathogens to cause disease in the agricultural sector may lead to a devastating effect on the economy and pose a significant threat to public health.   There can be lessons learned from the containment of 2017 bird flu outbreak from H5N6 strain that has resulted in billions of pesos lost and the 2014 henipah incident in Southern Philippines.  A coordinated response is necessary to assure the citizens that protecting public health remains a prime consideration. This is a potential threat to food security that may cross borders through trade. Strengthening biosecurity safeguards that incorporate best practices gained from natural outbreaks may help in implementing measures to prevent, prepare and respond to agroterrorism. This session will also discuss briefly the development of the proposed Philippine national biological materials of concern list (human, animal, plant and overlap pathogens list) and how this may contribute to biosecurity and prevention of agroterrorism.


Connecting Biosafety Communities

Ms Maureen Ellis

Executive Director

International Federation of Biosafety Associations


The International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) serves as a platform for ongoing exchange and collaboration between biosafety stakeholders worldwide. Our global network of member biosafety associations and observer organizations serves as a “Community of Practice” who share a similar concern for strengthening biosafety and biosecurity practices. By regularly interacting together, we disseminate best practices and implementation solutions from one country to others and facilitate their adoption locally. We share “recipes” as opposed to “menus” (i.e. countries are not offered a menu of solutions but rather are taught to develop their own solutions based on local requirements and resources). At the same time, we are guiding our biosafety communities from a knowledge-based profession (i.e. memorizing and recalling information) towards applying that knowledge through problem solving. The end result is sound, risk-based judgements and solutions that best meet local needs.

We know that successful change comprises a series of overlapping steps: a) creating a climate and urgency for change; b) engaging and enabling our global community; and c) implementing and sustaining the change. Furthermore, we recognize that building and empowering our biosafety communities to progressively influence changes in biosafety practices at the local level is only the first step in the process. In recent years, it has been argued that success in the longer term will require a movement towards “Global Health Security, Solidarity and Sustainability”.  Our approach in connecting biosafety communities is thus crafted from the building blocks of solidarity, equality and mutual understanding. Local biosafety communities are provided the opportunity to authentically contribute their unique skills and expertise not only at the institutional level, but also at the national, regional and international levels. Together we are focusing on sustainable global change based on providing an opportunity for all partners to be actively engaged, innovative and creative in their approaches.


Not by Good Intentions Alone: Educating Scientists about Dual-Use Bioethics and Changing Mindsets on Biosecurity

Dr Tatyana Novossiolova

Analyst – Center for the Study of Democracy, Bulgaria.


The issue of dual-use life science research, whereby benignly intended science can yield results that could potentially be misused for malevolent purposes either by States or non-State actors has been subject to an extensive deliberation over the past 15 years both in policy and academic circles. Cutting-edge biotechnology advances such as CRISPR and ‘gain-of-function’ research promise wide-raging benefits in the form of uncovering new pathways for treatment of diseases and generating novel therapeutics but, at the same time, they could also facilitate the development of sophisticated biological weapons. This is problematic, not least because of the significant gaps that still persist in the governance of such research, something evident in the prevalent lack of awareness of dual-use concerns among life scientists worldwide. The purpose of this paper is to enquire into the origins and scope of life science professional responsibility as regards dual-use research and to analyse its impact on the efforts to devise oversight systems and promote ethical practices. It further looks into the role of the life science epistemic community in effectively safeguarding its work, thus preserving science integrity and ensuring compliance with existing international regulations. Finally, the paper examines options of and intervention points for fostering a culture of responsibility in the life sciences.


Moving from Conventional to Learner-Based Biorisk Training

Dr Viji Vijayan

Assistant Dean

Duke-NUS Medical School


All workers who encounter biological hazards need to be trained in biosafety practices and usually this consists of online or face-to-face training with online material or lectures and multiple-choice questions as part of the assessment. The advantage is that the basic knowledge transfer can be achieved quickly and to more learners in a short time. The question however is whether this type of training is sufficient to deal with the myriads of differing situations the workers may face. Being safe is not just about understanding the theory but the use of practical methods to remain productive and safe, because success means remaining productive and safe at the same time.

In a recent study of research laboratory workers, I found that they developed resilience building methods to do just this. When faced with time sensitive and critical experiments, the workers used mental risk assessment to assess what safety and the experimental steps can be eliminated so that they can be quick and efficient. They also worked in teams, in fact some of the workers described long and tedious experiments as a carefully choreographed drama production with each player knowing what to do and all players watching out for each other? They learn these methods from their seniors and through their expertise and experience.  And yet in biosafety training we teach them none of this.

Aviation has a concept called Crew Resource Management, which does not teach them the technical aspects of how to fly a plane but skills such as situational awareness, decision making, assertiveness, leadership, flexibility, adaptability and communication. These of course are in addition to the technical aspects of how to fly a plane. In biology too it is necessary to supplement traditional biosafety training with other active learning strategies to make workers resilient to deal with the unexpected.


Development and Pilot Implementation of a Ladderized Biosafety Training Program in a Specialty Infectious Disease Hospital and Research Institute

Mr Plebeian Bautista Medina, RMT, MSMT, CBO, IFBA PC

Supervising Science Research Specialist

Research Institute for Tropical Medicine


Biosafety is the application of laboratory practices, use of safety equipment and implementation of procedures in laboratory facilities when working with potentially infectious microorganisms to protect not only the laboratory worker, but also the general public and the environment. Biosafety training specifically structured based on risk is vital to establish a safe working environment to reduce the risks of unintentional exposure and/or intentional release of infectious microorganisms. In 2016, a ladderized 3-step biosafety training program was established by the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine, a specialty infectious disease hospital and National Reference Laboratory in the Philippines. The training program includes 1) Biosafety 101, offered to all new RITM employees; 2) Applied Biosafety training, especially designed for laboratory personnel; and 3) Advanced Biosafety training, focused on developing Biosafety Officers and infectious disease outbreak responders. A 30% increase in awareness on biosafety has been achieved among participants of the first two steps of the program, with the third module to be implemented in 2017.


Capacity Building of Biosafety Assurance on Animal Disease Prevention and Control in China

Dr Zhigao Bu, Professor

Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, CAAS


With the development of globalization, animal infectious disease continuously affects animal and human public health safety. Effective prevention and control of animal infectious disease are important parts of national biosafety. Significant improvement has been made in hardware and software for animal disease prevention and control in China in recent years. Specialized research institutions focusing on different severe animal diseases pay high attention to the building of high level biosafety laboratories including P3 and P4 laboratory. Many animal experimental platforms including clean experimental animal and complex animal experimental infection laboratories with high biosafety level have been successfully established. In addition, more and more overseas talented persons are being recruited to contribute to the animal infectious disease prevention and control in China. With the extensive national financial support, revolutionary progress has been made in basic research and product development for preventing and controlling different animal diseases. Undoubtedly, efficacious prevention and control of animal diseases will provide important support for national biological security.


Methodology of Select Biological Agent and Toxin Management Investigation in Institute with Gap Analysis

Dr Hsing-Ming Chen

Taiwan Biological Safety Association, Taiwan, China


In order to understand the current situation in the unities that use or keep Select Biological Agent and Toxin (SBAT) in Taiwan, China, we drafted  “SBAT Questionnaire to investigate and analyze the current management situation. The SBAT Questionnaire was drafted by the following criteria:

1. The questionnaire was drawn up according to European, American, Japanese, WHO and Taiwan SBAT management regulations.

2. The questionnaire were divided into 11 major subjects, including the management structure, operation culture, emergency response, physical protection, self-check/audit, operation funds and other management systems.

3. The questionnaire must be filled by Responsible Official (RO) or senior researcher and must be approved by the Institute Biosafety Committee (IBC).

4. The questionnaires were analyzed by Gap Analysis to indicate the deficiencies in the management of SA in unity.

Through this investigation and Gap Analysis, the results indeed help us to understand the existing attitude and cognition in SBAT management in unity. It could help us to cover or fill the gap of management system and regulation. As based on the finding in this evaluation, we also could design the required training course in place accurately to promote the personal quality.


Evolution & Capacity Building of National Biosafety Organization with National and International collaborative Engagement 

Dr Aamer Ikram, Dr Zeba Rasmussen, Dr Stacey Knobler, Dr Shamsul Arfin Qasmi, Dr Uzma Bashir Aamir


Objectives: Components significant to help strengthen a national biosafety organization.

Life sciences research is rapidly increasing in institutions across urban and rural Pakistan.  The Global Health Security Agenda signifies that laboratories need expert training in biorisk practices. The Pakistan Biological Safety Association (PBSA) was established in 2008 with the aim to disseminate biorisk training.  PBSA has conducted workshops on biosafety and biosecurity awareness throughout the country; regular communication on a weekly-biweekly basis has been established in the course of time. As human and financial resources were mobilized, additional events became possible: training of master trainers using methods for adult education, and practical workshop (“wet”) training to demonstrate the use of various levels of PPE, spill clean ups, and management of emergencies in a lab.  This has led to the creation of a small group of young, energetic trainers from multiple, geographically diverse institutes, who have been able to train others with on-site coaching from the master trainer who taught them—a multiplier effect. 

Participants of workshops have been keen to incorporate new concepts learned in events at their home institutions within a short period of time. Scenario-based training materials for bioawareness workshops have been developed, with facilitator guides, and translated into the national language and four provincial languages. PBSA has created with assistance, a survey about the type, location and maintenance of biosafety cabinets in order to identify unmet needs and to develop potential solutions.  A new website, LinkedIn and Facebook pages have been developed.  Regional chapters are developing under the leadership of local PBSA life members. Life membership is gradually increasing.

After collaboration with Fogarty’s International Centre, NIH US, PBSA in last four years, PBSA has conducted training workshops throughout Pakistan, teaching ~750 health professionals from >250 institutions and producing 36 master trainers.


Bangladesh Biosafety and Biosecurity Society - Contribution to Government and Society 

Dr Asadulghani

Head, Biosafety and BSL3 Laboratory, icddr,b & President, Bangladesh Biosafety and Biosecurity Society

icddr,b & Bangladesh Biosafety and Biosecurity Society


The establishment of the Bangladesh Biosafety and Biosecurity Society was initiated in August 2011 to foster best and sustainable Biosafety and Biosecurity practices in Bangladesh considering the country’s situation of infectious diseases outbreaks and increasing demands for research and diagnostics of these disease-causing agents. Since its formation the Society is promoting biosafety and biosecurity knowledge to prevent and control biohazard in human health, animal health, and agriculture by conducting training, conferences, and workshops with the ultimate goal to create biosafety and biosecurity recommendations and guidelines for Bangladesh. The Society is working with responsible ministries, govt. bodies or committees, and other pertinent bodies to recommend policies and guidelines to fill out the gaps in the current guideline and framework. Currently the Society has 134 resource persons to work in the field of Biosafety and Biosecurity. Involving the resource persons’ advocacy and sensitization program is organized in all the 8 divisions in Bangladesh. Training program is being organized at different Universities and institutes. Resource persons are identifying laboratories handling biohazards. Trained assessors are conducting baseline assessment of laboratories suggesting short-term, mid-term, and long-term plans for further development. Society is organizing training for writing SOP and developing Biosafety Manual for the laboratories. The Bangladesh Biosafety and Biosecurity Guideline for the researcher and biosafety professionals in Bangladesh has also been drafted as a single source of document for conducting microbiological and biomedical research and diagnosis, developing research and diagnostic laboratories, and managing biological waste. Society members are currently working to initiate institutional biosafety committee at their own institutes. Academic curriculum has been developed and a few departments have already started courses on Biosafety and Biosecurity. Thus, the initiative strengthening biosafety and biosecurity status in Bangladesh is gradually moving towards a sustainable biosafety and biosecurity program for the nation.  


Biosafety and Biosecurity Initiatives by Thailand Biosafety Association: Strategic Framework and Challenges 

Professor Dr. Srisin Khusmith

Vice President of Biosafety Association of Thailand  &

Professor of  Faculty of Tropical Medicine, Mahidol University


The global threats posed by disease emergence and re-emergence, and rapid advancement of biotechnology are complex challenges. The establishment of Biosafety Association of Thailand (BAT) initiated in July, 2008 to foster a sustainable biosafety and biosecurity practices in Thailand.  In adherence with its national regulatory framework, a multisectoral approach was established to foster biorisk management among government, academia and commercial organizations. The significant initiatives have based on six pillars: a) positive increase in awareness the importance of biosafety standards and to strengthen biosafety oversight and practices; b) development of the sustainable biosafety & biosecurity culture and promoting self-regulation; c) participation strategies in the process of development and implementation of biosafety regulation by national authorities; d) effective implementation of the educational outreach and a cascade of training programs in biorisk management at various levels,  emphasizing on the core competencies of biosafety officers;  e) creating and increasing networking opportunities with national, regional and international organizations for sharing knowledge, experience and expertise; f) capacity building in biosafety and biosecurity through conferences, workshops, symposia and the association general meeting.  Importantly, BAT continuously offered the intensive courses for biosafety officers, which successfully trained significant amounts of core competent biosafety officers for academia, government and private sectors.  Key challenges are ethical practice and awareness-raising of dual use research; and how to build on individual and collective responsibility.  Code of conducts need to be tangible with a possible need for a legal framework that should not inhibit the relevant research. Greater dialogue and communication channels are recommended. As a consequence, strategic direction should include compliance promotion with all stakeholders through provision of technical expertise, guidance, tools and training to build capacity for biosecurity. Improved coordination among biosafety and biosecurity initiatives is necessary to efficiently match and combine expertise and resources, avoid redundant efforts and identify critical gaps.


The Network of National Pathogenic Microorganism Collection in China

Dr Qiang Wei

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention


The pathogenic microorganism is the core content of the biological safety of the laboratory, and it is the important foundation and support condition for the prevention and control of infectious diseases, scientific research, teaching, the production of drugs and biological products and the entry and exit inspection and quarantine. The system of national collection network is gradually formed in China. The collection of pathogenic microorganism resources will serve the basic scientific research better and serve the needs of the prevention and control of infectious diseases under the premise of ensuring the biosafety of the laboratory.


Biocontainment Inspections and Certifications in South Korea

Prof Dr Lee Hei Chan

Department of Pharmaceutical Engineering, Sun Moon University, Korea

Korea CDC Health & Biosafety Committee Member


There are two categories of laboratory facility handling the biological agents depending on the risk groups of the agents. One category of laboratory handling biological agents of Risk Group 1 & 2 needs to be registered. However, the other category of laboratory facility handling biological agents of Risk Group 3 & 4 shall obtain permission from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: CDC). BL3 & BL4 facilities are the examples.

After establishment of the LMO Act in 2008, over 60 high containment facilities have gone through the process and in operation. Public institutions in health and agriculture area and educational institutions took major part. “Transboundary movement, etc. of Living Modified Organism Act (Act No. 12844, Enforcement Data Nov. 19, 2014)”prescribes the improvement of people’s living conditions and international cooperation promotion are necessary for implementation of The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 

Every institution with permission for the establishment and operation of high containment facility should follow all the detailed rules for operation and maintenance. The biosafety concern over the country can be effectively monitored and controlled by cooperation of government (Korea CDC, Division of Biosafety Evaluation) and people of the nation. This is also to prevent risks posed by living modified organisms to public health and to conserve and use biological diversity in a sustainable way. 


Laboratory-Acquired Infections, 1979 to the Present

Dr Karen Byers

Dana Farber Cancer Institute, USA


Published reports of laboratory acquired infections (LAI) provide useful case studies for biosafety training as well as analysis of laboratory procedures. Data on 3,230 primary LAI, 33 secondary LAI, and 10 tertiary LAI will be analyzed in terms of the type of laboratory activity (clinical, research, industry, teaching, or field study) that resulted in infection and whether the LAI were caused by bacteria, viruses, parasites, or fungi. Some specific examples of trends, and how the data can be used in training, will be presented.


TB laboratory Management and Containment

A/Prof Nguyen Van Hung

Head of Department 

National Lung Hospital


Vietnam is one of the countries with a high burden of tuberculosis, especially the high prevalence of  Multidrug recistant  tuberculosis. World Health Organization  recorgnise Vietnam is one of the countries with success in TB control in the world. One of the reasons for success is the availability of a strong, stable, quality and biosafety assurance  TB laboratory network nationwide.  TB laboratories  have carried out all of the tests for the diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis from classic to modern, recommended by the World Health Organization . Each year, millions of specimens from suspected TB patients, MDR TB and XDR TB suspects, have been treated in more than one thousand TB laboratories of the National TB Program. Ensuring biosafety and biosecurity for TB laboratories at all levels is necessary and  mandatory, especialy in term of management and contaiment. TB laboratories  have been organized, designed and operated in accordance with national standards for TB testing based on risk assessment and classification of testing techniques at the biosafety level. The specific regulations on biosafety in TB laboratories are issued by the Ministry of Health, based on guidelines of the World Health Organization applying to the actual situation in Vietnam. In addition, monitoring of the implementation of tuberculosis infection control was conducted in all TB clinics.


Challenges in Implementing Biorisk Management Program in Academic Institution

Dr Anis Karuniawati

MD, PhD, Clinical Microbiologist

Faculty of Medicine, Universitas Indonesia

Indonesia One Health University Network


Zoonotic diseases have significant and growing threats with the potential of causing high impact on health, socioeconomic, tourism impact and national security. These threats, coupled by the rapid development and advancement of bioresearch at university and government laboratories, increase the potential of misuse as biological weapon. To minimize the impacts, major challenges must be overcome in the national laboratory capacity for rapid and accurate etiological identification and early detection following the bio-risk management guideline. Given these concern, Indonesia One Health University Network (INDOHUN) in collaboration with Tufts University with the support of U.S Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) is establishing One Health Laboratory Network. The aims of this network are to link potential university laboratories, targeting specific potential bioterrorism pathogen such as brucellosis, anthrax, and avian influenza to enhance rapid detection, secure handling and storage, and upgrade biosafety and biosecurity practices and laboratory standards. The current member of the network consists of 12 university laboratories in Indonesia; 6 microbiology, 5 parasitology, and 1 mixed. Many biological materials in these laboratories have been created, modified, and stored. They require safety procedures to keep the negative effects on humans and the environment as low as possible. During the project phase in 2017, the network has been established in the system. The implementation of bio-risk management has also been promoted and advocated. Lack of management commitment, infrastructure and facility, system and national policy on bio-risk management become the major challenges during the implementation of the project. In general, the university laboratories play important roles to strengthen the national security capacity through early identification and detection of zoonotic disease and (re)-emerging infectious diseases, including the pathogens that are potentially used as biological weapon. Improvements are greatly needed in bio-risk management, laboratory performance, and partnership/networking. Network among university and government laboratories should be established to overcome the global threat with effective solution to tackle EID, Zoonosis, and AMR issues.


Dr Xiangguo Qiu

National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada


Outlook of working in the box: how to work safely and efficiently in BSL-4

The Public Health Agency of Canada manages and maintains the only Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) in Canada and is located in Winnipeg, Manitoba.  Our lab conducts research and diagnostics on pathogens that are classified as high risk to animals and public health and where no approved preventatives or therapeutic treatments against these pathogens are available.  In order to work with these high risk pathogens individuals that work in the facility must be highly trained, obtain higher levels of security clearance and have more medical screening.  The operations of the BSL-4 laboratory is carried out by many different individuals and teams, ranging from the facilities team that maintain the physical lab to the Safety and Environmental (SES) team that is responsible for the biosafety and biosecurity aspects of the lab and finally the Special Pathogens department that works in the laboratory.  Management of the BSL-4 is critical in maintaining the high level of containment and to prevent incidents in the laboratory.  This includes many levels of certification from different governing bodies and annual shutdowns to recertify the laboratory to ensure that the Canadian Biosafety Standard Guidelines are being met.   In this presentation we will discuss all the work that is completed behind the scenes in keeping a BSL-4 laboratory functional.


Operation and Management of Biosafety Level 4 Laboratory in Canada

The Public Health Agency of Canada manages and maintains the only Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) in Canada and is located in Winnipeg, Manitoba.  Our lab conducts research and diagnostics on pathogens that are classified as high risk to animals and public health and where no approved preventatives or therapeutic treatments against these pathogens are available.  In order to work with these high risk pathogens individuals that work in the facility must be highly trained, obtain higher levels of security clearance and have more medical screening.  The operations of the BSL-4 laboratory is carried out by many different individuals and teams, ranging from the facilities team that maintain the physical lab to the Safety and Environmental (SES) team that is responsible for the biosafety and biosecurity aspects of the lab and finally the Special Pathogens department that works in the laboratory.  Management of the BSL-4 is critical in maintaining the high level of containment and to prevent incidents in the laboratory.  This includes many levels of certification from different governing bodies and annual shutdowns to recertify the laboratory to ensure that the Canadian Biosafety Standard Guidelines are being met.   In this presentation we will discuss all the work that is completed behind the scenes in keeping a BSL-4 laboratory functional.


U.S. CDC Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Risk Assessment Efforts

Dr. John M Saindon

US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA


The U.S Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will present on findings of the readiness of Biosafety & Biosecurity as it relates to Global Health Security. These findings are from our CDC internal and external collaborations, and value added of sharing these expertise.  Focus will be placed on the 10 Biosafety & Biosecurity actionable GHSA indicators, which include the initial onset readiness of GHSA in 2014 and the current 2018 readiness status.  The presentation will also include recommendations on how to prioritize the indicators, partner collaboration opportunities, and available tools and resources currently available or being developed to assist participating countries accomplish GHSA readiness.


Current Situations, Challenges and Way Forward in Biosafety, Biosecurity and Biorisk Management in Brunei Darussalam

Ms Sia Fwu Shii

Scientific Officer

Department of Scientific Services, Ministry of Health


Brunei has been actively looking into our National Biosafety and Biosecurity as part of the CBRN mitigation initiatives from Prime Minister’s Office with the support from Ministry of Health and other relevant ministries.
Some of those ini

Hotel Accommodation



Pullman Beijing South Hotel
12 Ronghua South Road. Beijing Economic Technological Development.
Yizhuang, Beijing 100176 - P.R. China


Accommodation & Room Reservation:


Download room reservation form HERE to enjoy special room rate for conference delegates. Kindly note that concession rate for conference delegate end on 28 July 2018.


Visa Application Procedure 

To facilitate your visa application:

A-PBA and our partner (CPMA) will issue invitation letters upon confirmation of your registration and upon request

Please ensure the following conference document for VISA application:

  • Two conference invitation letters  (one from A-PBA and one from CPMA)
  • Hotel reservation confirmation
  • Flight itinerary
  • Any other supporting document as required by your country’s China Embassy (kindly check with your country’s china embassy)

For further assistance on visa application, please contact

Ms Majing email : jingma@ciccst.org.cn

Prof Heya  email  : shiwukeya@163.com

Sponsorship & Exhibition Opportunity


2 days of exhibition booth space on conference days (30 - 31 August 2018)

Advertisement space in the program booklet, sponsorship of luncheon, coffee break and many more options to fit your expectation.


Who should sponsor/exhibit?

Anyone who supplies, manufactures, provides services or products correlated to biomedical research or biological safety.


  • Download the Sponsorship Prospectus HERE
  • Download the Sponsorship Application Form HERE
  • Booth number and layout will be available soon 

IFBA Certification Exam


The IFBA is pleased to collaborate with the A-PBA in the delivery of the IFBA’s Professional Certifications during their upcoming 13th Biosafety Conference. The exam session will be held at 2pm on Wednesday, August 29th in Beijing, China. For further details on the event click here.


In addition to offering the Professional Certification in Biorisk Management, we will also be offering the new IFBA Professional Certifications in Biosecurity, Biocontainment Facilities, Biosafety Cabinets and Biological Waste Management. Only those individuals who have successfully completed the pre-requisite Biorisk Management certification are eligible for these new certifications. For information on the exam content, study materials and sample questions, click here


All applications must be processed through the on-line Certifior system at https://ifba.certifior.com. These instructions will guide individuals through the application process. For further details and enquiries on this session please contact the IFBA Secretariat by email at secretariat@internationalbiosafety.org.

Enquiry & Contact


General Enquiry for Registration and Payment for conference, workshop, & Booth Exhibition etc:


Accommodation & Room Reservation:


Exhibition Booth Logistic Matter:


Other Inquiry:

A-PBA Annual General Meeting (AGM) 2018


This is to announce that A-PBA Annual General Meeting (AGM) 2018 will be held in conjunction with the A-PBA 13th Biosafety Conference in Beijing, China:


Date     : 30 Aug 2018
Venue  : Pullman Beijing South Hotel
Time    : 5.10pm local time  


Proposed Agenda of AGM:

1.     Adoption of the minutes of AGM 2017

2.     Annual report from A-PBA EXCO April 2017 - 2018

3.     Presentation of Financial Year (FY) 2017 Report

4.     Motion from EXCO – Nomination of 5 Country Representative in A-PBA Executive Council.

5.     Members’ motions

6.     Other matter & updates


A special members’ motion may be requested (by no less than 7 voting members) to be included in the agenda of the AGM by writing to the Secretary no later than 15 Aug 2018. 

The AGM will start at 5.10pm sharp. Please be seated on time.

Note: Only active voting members (non-expiring individual membership) are allowed to vote at the AGM.